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A B S T R A C T
_________________________________
Empirical evidence on how ownership 
structures influence decision to pay 
dividends remain unclear in the 
dividend policy literature. This paper 
is set to investigate the association 
between ownership structures and 
decision to pay dividends. The sample 
firms of this study consist of non-
financial firms listed on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange for the period 2011 to 
2015 with 270 firm-year observations 
and logit regression models used 
to examine the relationship. The 
study revealed strong evidence that 
institutional investors were positively 
related to the decision to pay dividends. 
However, managerial shareholding 
was found to have an inverse effect 
on firms’ probability to pay dividends.
 Additional analysis was carried out 
only on dividend payers and the 
results were also consistent with the 
hypothesis. Despite this, the managerial 
investors were somehow weak when the 
sample was reduced to dividend payers.
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Cumulatively, the results are robust 
and show support of the agency theory 
and hence, imply that institutional 
investors in Nigeria have preference for 
dividend payers.
 
1.     Introduction
Dividend policy has been a topical issue over the years and remains a subject 
of vital concern in modern finance (Baker & Weigand, 2015). Additionally, Al-
malkawi, Rafferty, and Pillai (2010) noted that dividend policy has become the 
top agenda item of managers in the modern corporate world and has emerged 
as a contending topic in the field of accounting and finance. Karpavičius (2014) 
also noted that a firm’s dividend payout is important in the determination of its 
value, and dividend stability increases the value of the firm. Hence, dividend 
is crucial to the shareholders as well as to the firm. The relationship between 
dividend payout and institutional investors has been empirically documented in 
the literature (for example, Afza & Mirza, 2011; Huda & Abdullah, 2014; Manos, 
2003; Miko & Kamardin, 2015; Short, Zhang, & Keasey, 2002). However, 
evidence on the association between decision to pay dividend and institutional 
ownership is lacking in the academic literature particularly from the emerging 
market where the institutional setting is distinct from the developed markets. 
More so, as the decision to pay dividend is a prerequisite to the level of dividend 
and hence, the decision to pay or not to pay dividend should be determined in the 
light of institutional investors prior to considering the magnitude of the dividend 
payout (Idris, Ishak, & Hassan, 2017).
On the decision to pay dividend, companies are allowed by the regulators 
to pay dividends only out of its current profits or its revenue reserves (SEC 
Nigeria, 2013). Likewise, firms are not allowed to borrow on the grounds for 
dividend payment. However, with regards to the institutional owners, the capital 
market regulators have mandated these investors (institutional investors and 
other large shareholders) to actively participate in the firms of which they invest 
(SEC Nigeria, 2011). The participation will allow them to influence positively in 
the financial policies of the firms. Moreover, in terms of taxation, the institutional 
investors have no tax incentive better than other shareholders as dividends 
are paid net of withholding tax of 10%. Therefore, it is unclear as to whether 
institutional investors may influence dividend decision or not. Consequently, in 
Nigeria, on average, the institutional investors have the highest percentage of 
shareholdings which accounts for about 48% of the total shares listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange market (Abor & Fiador, 2013). Accordingly, these 
investors may have significant influence on the decision to pay dividend because 
of their primary objective which is return on equity in the form of dividend. 
Furthermore, the institutional investors may pay much attention to the economic 
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benefits attached to their shareholdings in various firms (Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, 
& Hashimoto, 2005).
This paper tends to empirically explore the potential relationship between 
decision to pay dividend and ownership structure using data set from Nigeria. 
Thus, the paper contributes to the dividend literature through examining the role 
played by institutional and managerial owners on determining whether to pay 
or not to pay a dividend. It also examines whether there is significant difference 
between dividend and non-dividend paying firms in relation to their institutional 
and managerial ownership.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers literature review and 
develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion on 
the data and methodology used in the study. The empirical findings of the paper 
are reported in Section 4 while the conclusion of the paper is in Section 5.
2.     Review of Literature and Research Hypothesis
Several legal and corporate governance changes have taken place for the purpose 
of restructuring and empowering board of directors in handling corporate bodies 
or inspiring institutional shareholders activism (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007). 
Institutional shareholders are believed to be more knowledgeable and capable of 
handling self-dealing issues in the firm (Afza & Mirza, 2011). They argued that 
the presence of the institutional investor may likely reduce the severity of agency 
conflicts among competing parties. Invariably, institutional investors are found 
to be influential in various aspects of the corporate entity’s activities. These areas 
may include executive compensation (Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006; Victoravich, 
Xu, & Gan, 2013) enhancement of audit quality (Han, Kang, & Rees, 2013) 
earnings management (Hsu & Koh, 2005), improving firm value (Navissi & 
Naiker, 2006) and share price volatility (Dennis & Strickland, 2002; Rubin & 
Smith, 2009). Moreover, institutional investors do influence corporate payout 
policy (Chang, Kang, & Li, 2016; Miko & Kamardin, 2015; Short et al., 2002).
2.1 Institutional Ownership and Decision to Pay Dividends
The agency theorists have posited that firm managers are more interested 
in retaining substantial amount of corporate profits. The retained profits will 
allow them to have substantial amount of corporate resources within their reach 
or control and therefore, provide the managers an avenue for empire building 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, paying dividends may help to mitigate 
agency costs that may arise between shareholders and corporate managers. 
This is because payment of the dividend by the firm is likely to compel the firm 
to source for funding from the capital market and hence, expose the firm to 
monitoring by the market (Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982). Extant literature 
has suggested that institutional ownership is likely to reduce agency conflict 
by influencing managers to distribute free cash flow to the shareholders (Chang 
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et al., 2016; Grinstein & Michaely, 2005; Jory, Ngo, & Sakaki, 2017; Miko & 
Kamardin, 2015; Short et al., 2002; Sindhu, Hashmi, & Haq, 2016). Chang et 
al. (2016) examines how institutional owners influence dividend policy from 
the agency perspectives. The study establishes a significant positive association 
between institutional owners and dividend payout. They added that the positive 
association is more salient when there is weak external monitoring. Further, the 
study argued that institutional owners may use dividend as a monitoring tool 
to address agency related problems subject to the financial performance of the 
firm. Along this line, there is equally strong evidence supporting the argument 
that higher dividends increase the stake of institutional investors (Jory et al., 
2017).  
However, from the tax clientele view of dividends, Allen, Antonio, and 
Welch (2000) posited that tax incentives attract more institutional shareholders 
in the U.S. market to invest in dividend paying firms than non-dividend paying 
firms. From the emerging markets, the evidence also supports the proposition that 
institutional investors and dividend payout are positively correlated. Sindhu et al. 
(2016) observed that strong positive relationship prevails between institutional 
investors and dividend payouts from the Pakistani market. The study showed 
that institutional investors used dividends as a mechanism for monitoring 
managers with a view to mitigate agency problem. The result is consistent with 
the previous evidence advanced by Miko and Kamardin (2015) from Nigeria 
that also reveals statistically strong association between dividend payout and 
institutional ownership. The study suggested that institutional investors force 
managers to disgorge free cash flow from the firm such that managers may not 
have excess to embark on empire building or perquisite consumption. Likewise, 
Francis, Hasan, John, and Song (2011) found that decision to pay dividends by 
firms tends to increase when the shares held by institutional owners increases. 
Recently, the result of Jacob, Jijo and Lukose (2018) suggest that institutional 
ownership has significant positive effects on the propensity to pay dividends. 
Overall, the demand for dividends by institutional investors is in line with the 
indirect monitoring of managers and free riding arguments (Short et al., 2002). 
Based on these theoretical explanations, the study hypothesized that;
H1: Positive relationship prevails between institutional ownership and decision 
to pay dividends.
2.2 Managerial Ownership and Decision to Pay Dividends
Agency theory has suggested that dividend payouts could be used as a 
mechanism to reduce agency costs and to control particular set of investors 
from gaining far above the other set (Rozeff, 1982). Managerial ownership is 
used interchangeably with insider ownership, directors’ holdings among others 
(Farinha, 2003; Francis et al., 2011; Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2010; Short et al., 
2002). Dividend policy is among the techniques that provide control in a firm 
against potential agency problems. The probability of managers owning a stake 
in a company may portray the likelihood of alleviating agency problems (Jensen 
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& Meckling, 1976). The argument is that, because the managers form part of 
the shareholders, they may not go against the interests of other shareholders 
by wasting the accumulated cash. This is because such an act may affect the 
entire shareholders of the firm. The arguments on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and dividend payout are based on a monitoring effect 
(Florackis, Kanas, & Kostakis, 2015; Francis et al., 2011; Short et al., 2002). 
The monitoring hypothesis suggests that managerial ownership and dividend 
policy are inversely related, implying that managers are likely to pursue projects 
that maximize shareholder value. Consistent with this argument, evidence from 
the Nigerian market supports the agency theory prediction on the association 
between managerial ownership and dividend payout (Dandago, Farouk, & 
Muhibudeen, 2015; Miko & Kamardin, 2015; Ullah, Fida, & Khan, 2012). The 
studies found negative association between managerial ownership and dividend 
payout. The results are also in agreement with extant literature (Al-Amarneh 
& Yaseen, 2014; Rizqia & Aisjah, 2013; Sindhu et al., 2016). That inverse 
correlation exists between shares held by managers and dividend policy. Hu 
and Kumar (2004) also reported that firms with low insider ownership are more 
likely to pay dividends to the shareholders and Francis et al. (2011) documented 
that the likelihood to pay dividends decreases with an increase in managerial 
shareholding. More recently, Farooq and Ahmed (2019) showed that insider 
ownership is negatively related to the likelihood of dividend payment; hence, 
consistent with the agency theory.
H2: Managerial ownership is negatively associated with decision to pay 
dividends.
3.     Methodology
The sample for the data analysis of this paper consists of non-financial firms 
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period 2011 to 2015. The choice 
of period for instance, marked the implementation of the 2011 Code of corporate 
governance and the end of the financial crisis; whereas, the choice of 2015 was 
due to availability of data used for the study. The study excludes financial firms 
for two reasons. Firstly, financial firms are governed by financial regulatory 
authorities such as the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigeria Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) and Nigerian Insurance Commission (NAICOM). These 
regulatory authorities for example CBN, requires banks to adequately provide 
for minimum capital adequacy ratio, cash reserve either low or moderate and 
a non-performing loan ratio not exceeding 5% prior to paying dividends to the 
shareholders. Secondly, prior studies on decision to pay dividends excludes 
financial firms from the final sample of their investigations (see for example, 
Baker, Dutta, & Saadi, 2008; Chang et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2011; Idris et al., 
2017; Pucheta-Martínez & López-Zamora, 2017) and factors affecting dividend 
policy varies from financial to non-financial firms (Baker et al., 2008). The data 
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were collected from the annual report of individual firms. The annual reports 
were obtained simultaneously from individual websites of the firms and the 
NSE website. The model of the study is as follows and is used in testing the 
hypotheses of the study.
DIVDUMi = β0 + β1INSTDUMi + β2MANGOWSi + β3FSIZEi + β4RETEi + 
β5FLEVi + β6LNSALEi + βjYEARi + βkINDUSTRYi +εi
Besides the two variables of interest, institutional and managerial ownership, the 
study includes various control variables that were found to be important in the 
literature on the decision to pay dividends. Firm size, retained earnings, leverage 
and sales and their definitions and sources are provided in Table 3.1. The study 
also controls for year effect using five dummies. The use of the year dummy 
is important as 2011 was the year that marked the implementation of the new 
SEC code of corporate governance and demanded that the institutional owners 
to actively participate in its enforcement of the industry effect. Likewise, ten 
dummies have been used for the industry effect. This is because the decision to 
pay dividends may be affected by the industry as the number of firms within the 
industries is not evenly distributed. Prior studies such as (Francis et al., 2011; 
Jiraporn, Kim, & Kim, 2011; Liljeblom & Maury, 2016; Sharma, 2011) have 
considered year and industry effect while studying propensity to pay dividends.




DIVDUM Dummy variable 
that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm pays 
dividends and 0 if 
otherwise.
(Chang et al., 2016; 
Pucheta-Martínez 




DIVYLD The dividend yield 
is estimated as 
dividend per share 
divided by the share 
price at the end of 
a year
(Chang et al., 2016; Hu 
& Kumar, 2004)
INSTDUM Total institutional 
ownership ratio 
and takes the 
value of 1 if a firm 
has institutional 
investors and 0 if, 
otherwise.
+ (Chang et al., 2016; 
Francis et al., 2011; 
Jory et al., 2017)
MANGOWS Management 
ownership is the 
total percentage of 
equity owned by a 
firm’s directors.
- (Francis et al., 2011; 
Pucheta-Martínez & 
López-Zamora, 2017; 
Sindhu et al., 2016)
(continued)




FSIZE Logarithm of total 
assets.
+ (Pucheta-Martínez & 
López-Zamora, 2017; 
Sharma, 2011)
RETE Retained earnings to 
total capital.
+ (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
& Stulz, 2006; Francis 
et al., 2011; Jiraporn et 
al., 2011)
FLEV Total debt divided by 
total assets.
- (Chang et al., 2016; 
DeAngelo et al., 2006)
LNSALE Logarithm of annual 
sales.
-/+ (Jeon, Lee, & Moffett, 
2011; Liljeblom & 
Maury, 2016) 
4.    Analysis of Results
Table 2, Panel A depicts the descriptive statistics of the variable used in the 
study and only the two variables of interest have been discussed in the summary 
statistics. Also in Table 2, Panel B provides further summary statistics on the 
two independent variables. Firms that paid dividends for the sample period 
on average accounted for 60.7% per. This indicated that more than half of the 
listed firms on the NSE paid dividends. Regarding the institutional investors, the 
average value was 48.6 % with a minimum and maximum of 0.00 and 98.2%, 
respectively. This statistic showed that there were a considerable number of 
institutional shareholders in some firms with a few firms having none. This was 
also the case for managerial ownership. Among the sample firms in this study, 
managerial ownership was found to have an average value of 7% and a median 
of 1%. Furthermore, the highest and lowest value for this variable was 0.00 to 
70.8%, respectively.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
DIVDUM 0.61 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49
INSTOW 0.49 0.54 0.00 0.98 0.27
INSTDUM 0.90 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.29
MANGOWS 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.15
FSIZE 7.04 6.97 5.78 8.36 0.71
RETE 0.14 0.14 -0.67 0.57 0.31
FLEV 0.24 0.11 0.00 1.62 0.38
LNSALES 6.87 7.00 4.00 9.00 0.89
(continued)
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Panel A
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
SALES 39900000 7347873 26130 651000000 81600000
Panel B 
(n=89) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Institutional 
own =1
Number 78 80 81 81 82
Percent 87.64 89.89 91.01 91.01 92.13
M a n a g e r i a l 
own =1
Number 45 46 45 44 43
Percent 50.56 51.69 50.56 49.44 48.31
Note: Divdum is decision to pay dividend and takes the value of 1 if the firm pays 
dividends and 0, if otherwise; Instdum is total institutional ownership ratio and takes the 
value of 1 if a firm has institutional investors and 0, if otherwise; Mangows is managerial 
ownership which is the total percentage of equity owned by a firm’s directors; Fsize is 
logarithm of total assets ; Rete is Retained earnings to total capital; Flev is Total debt 
divided by total assets; Lnsales logarithm of annual sales.
The summary statistics reported in Table 2, Pane B, shows the data in 
relation to ownership variables. For the institutional investors, there has been a 
consistent increase. For instance, in 2015, institutional investors accounted for 
92% as compared with 88% in 2011. This meant that there was a steady increase 
in the presence of institutional investors during the sample period. While 
institutional investors had increased, the managerial owners on the other hand, 
remain relatively fixed. Evidently, the presence of managerial owners dropped 
during the study period from 51% in 2011 to 48% in 2015. This result could 
imply that agency problems may be addressed with the payment of dividends as 
suggested in prior studies.
Table 3. Correlation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VIF Tol
1.DIVDUM 1.00
2.INSTDUM 0.16*** 1.00 1.21 0.83
3.MANGOWS -0.27*** -0.36*** 1.00 1.39 0.72
4.FSIZE 0.35*** -0.05 -0.3*** 1.00 1.24 0.80
5.RETE 0.49*** 0.15** -0.21*** 0.24*** 1.00 1.11 0.91
6.FLEV -0.10* 0.00 0.30*** -0.32*** -0.16*** 1.00 1.19 0.84
7.LNSALES 0.09* 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
The variables have been defined in Table 4.1 above. *, **and *** are significant at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively.
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The analysis of correlation is reported in Table 3. The correlation 
analysis between the dependent and independent variables is to enable the study 
to ascertain the direction and strength of relationship. From the correlation 
matrix, the results showed a strong positive association between decision 
to pay dividends and the presence of institutional owners. It was found to be 
statistically significant at 1%. Thus, this implied that firms with institutional 
owners may demand the payment of dividends. Conversely, the association of 
decision to pay dividends and managerial ownership was found to be negative 
and was also statistically …. The result of the correction meant that decision to 
pay dividends and the management holding were inversely related. Furthermore, 
the correlation also suggested that the presence of institutional owners could 
result in a low stake in managerial shares.
The result pertaining to Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test that is reported 
in Table 3 demonstrates that none of the values for VIF is equal or greater than 
10 threshold (Gujarati, 2004). Similarly, the Tolerance (Tol) values in the study 
were also within the acceptable level that is below the value of 1. Hence, the 
collinearity test provided additional evidence on the absence of multicollinearity 
that could endanger the findings of the study.
Table 4. Univariate Comparison
Dividend nonpayers (n=175) Dividend payers (n=270)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. 
Dev.
t-value
INSTDUM 0.85 0.36 0.94 0.24 -3.07***
MANGOWS 0.12 0.19 0.04 0.10 5.18***
The variables have been defined in Table 4.1 above. *, **and *** are significant at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively
A comparison between dividend non-payers and payers revealed further 
interesting results. Both the mean and the standard deviation suggested that the 
dividend payers were distinct from non-payers. From the results in Table 4, the 
nonpayers had a mean value of 85% which was lower than 94% for the dividend 
payers which was statistically significant. The summary statistics implied that 
the institutional owners were prevalent in the dividend paying firms. In addition 
to the result of the group mean, the group standard deviation of the non-dividend 
payers was also different from the dividend paying firms. The non-dividend 
paying firms had a higher standard deviation of 36.2% when compared with 
23.7% for the dividend paying firms. Pertinent to the managerial shareholding, 
the mean value for the non-payers was 11.9% which was much higher than 
3.8% scored by the dividend payers. Tests of mean differences in this case were 
statistically significant at 1%. The result could suggest that managers may be 
more inclined to non-dividend payers than paying firms.
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Table 5. Logit Regression with Robust Standard Errors
PANEL A PANEL B
Expected 
sign
Coefficient Z-Statistics Marginal 
effects
Z-Statistics
INSTDUM + 0.71* 1.69* 0.10* 1.69
MANGOWS - -1.50* -1.70* -0.22* -1.71
FSIZE + 1.18 4.00*** 0.17*** 4.28
RETE + 4.29 6.12*** 0.62*** 7.93
FLEV - 0.29 0.88 0.04 0.89
LNSALES -/+ 0.41 3.19*** 0.06*** 3.27
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes





H-L test p-value 0.1589
The variables have been defined in Table 4.1 above. *, **and *** are significant at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively.
The study performed regression analysis to get more insights on how 
ownership affected decision to pay dividends and control for factors that included 
firm size, retained earnings, leverage and sales in which prior studies had clearly 
highlighted their importance in dividend policy literature. Table 5 shows the 
result of the robust logit regression estimation containing estimation based on 
coefficient and odd ratios along with their z-values. The model had a likelihood 
ratio Chi-square value of 99.15 and was statistically significant at 1% with a 
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 of 33.5% thus showing the goodness of fit of the model 
and confirmed the assertion that at least one of the coefficients in the model 
influenced the decision to pay dividends which was the dependent variable. 
The study also ran a classification test in order to determine the percentage 
of correctly predicted cases and how the model predicted group membership. 
Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant (2013) argued that the classification table 
was an intuitively appealing way that provided a summary of the results of a 
fitted logistic regression. In this regard, the percentage of group membership 
correctly predicted by the model was 81.12% which was far above 50% the 
bench mark for a failed model (Pampel, 2000) therefore, suggesting the fitness 
of the model. Lastly, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (H-L test) also confirmed the 
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model fit of the logit regression as the H-L Chi-square value of 11.83 with an 
insignificant p-value of 0.1589.
Table 5 provides the results of the individual variable of interest. The 
coefficient of the institutional investors was positive and statistically significant 
at 10%. Furthermore, the results also showed that the presence of institutional 
investors (INSTDUM) in a firm was more likely to make cash dividend 
payments which was in line with Hypothesis one (H1) and the agency theory. 
This suggested that institutional investors helped address agency conflict by 
encouraging dividend payments as a monitoring device. Thus, the result agreed 
with previous findings (Chang et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2011; Grinstein & 
Michaely, 2005; Jacob et al., 2018; Jory et al., 2017; Miko & Kamardin, 2015; 
Short et al., 2002; Sindhu et al., 2016) that firms with institutional owners were 
more likely to pay dividends.
However, managerial ownership (MANGOWS) had a negative and 
significant effect on the NSE-firms’ decision to pay dividends. The logit 
regression revealed that the coefficient estimates on managerial ownership was 
negative and statistically significant at 10%. The result suggested that higher 
managerial shareholding was less likely to lead to more dividend payments. 
This result corroborated previous studies (Farooq & Ahmed, 2019; Francis et al., 
2011; Hu & Kumar, 2004; Miko & Kamardin, 2015; Sindhu et al., 2016) which 
reported that the likelihood of paying dividends decreased with the increase in 
managerial shareholding, hence, this was consistent with Hypothesis 2 (H2). The 
result could suggest that dividend was used in the NSE to curtail the managers 
from wasting free cash since the managerial holding was on the decreasing 
path. It has been argued that dividend payments are important as it is part of 
the optimal monitoring or bonding tool that a firm may use to reduce agency 
costs (Rozeff, 1982). Alternatively, the result showed that managers in the NSE 
preferred profit retention instead of disbursing it as dividends to the ordinary 
shareholders and this could likely lead to perquisite consumption
The result of the control variables employed in the current study revealed 
firm size and retained earnings to be positive and statistically significant as 
expected and was consistent with prior evidence (for instance, Jiraporn, Kim, & 
Kim, 2011; Liljeblom & Maury, 2016). Thus, indicating that larger firms with 
higher retained earnings exhibited a higher likelihood of paying cash dividends. 
More so, the result of sales revenue was also found to be positive and statistically 
significant. Hence, suggesting that firms with more sales revenue had a higher 
probability of paying dividends among the listed firms in Nigeria. This result 
therefore, supported earlier findings on propensity to pay dividends.
Besides the reported results based on the coefficient of each variable, 
the study also estimated the marginal effect of the independent variables on 
outcome. This is to provide further support to the findings of logit regression 
results with marginal effects, which is depicted in Table 4.3 Panel B. According 
to Williams (2012), the marginal effect, otherwise referred to as economic 
significance, was another way by which the effects of variables in nonlinear 
models such as logit regression analysis could be made more meaningful. In 
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other words, the marginal effect provided a representative value for variables 
in nonlinear models. This paper used the average marginal effect because it was 
superior than other techniques (Williams, 2012).
The analysis of the marginal effect is reported in Table 5. Both the two 
variables of interest retained their signs and statistical significance indicating 
their impact on the decision to pay dividends among the NSE firms. Institutional 
ownership had a marginal effect of 10.3% which was positive and statistically 
significant at 10%. This meant that for every 1% change on the decision to pay 
dividends, it followed that, all things being equal, the institutional shareholding 
increased by 10.3%. The result implied that the presence of institutional 
investors exerted a greater influence on a firm to pay cash dividends and in turn 
forced firms to consider raising more funds for investment when necessary in the 
capital and hence, could result in more market monitoring which in turn agreed 
with the agency theory (Rozeff, 1982).
Conversely, the marginal effect of the managerial shareholding although 
it was negative, was higher than the reported marginal effect for the institutional 
investors as depicted in Table 5, Panel B. The result showed that it was negative 
and statistically significant which meant that for 1% additional share of 
managerial ownership, the decision to pay dividends decreased by 21.8%. This 
result showed how important managerial shareholding was to firms which could 
consider paying cash dividends. The negative sign of the association between 
managerial shareholding and decision to pay dividends further, aligned with 
the argument advanced by Rozeff (1982) that dividend payout was an optimal 
mechanism that could be used to reduce agency costs as the stake of the managers 
declined in the firm.
4.2 Additional Analysis
The study also carried out two more additional analysis to ascertain the robustness 
of the findings (see for example, Al-Najjar & Kilincarslan, 2016; Chang et al., 
2016; Francis et al., 2011; Hu & Kumar, 2004). In the first specification, the study 
classified the firms into low and high based on their dividend yield and estimated 
the model using logit regression with robust standard errors specifications. The 
result was reported in Table 4.3. Interestingly, the model fitness was also found 
to be statistically significant at 1% with a Chi-Square value of 59.85 and pseudo 
R2 of 35.03%. Moreover, the coefficient of the two key variables retained their 
signs with institutional shareholding becoming more significant than in the main 
model of Table 3. The result showed that institutional shareholding was positive 
and statistically significant at 1%, indicating that institutional shareholders were 
concerned about firms that paid higher dividends. The results also confirmed 
the agency theory argument that institutional investors may use dividend as a 
form of control mechanism in the firm to avoid free riding problems. For the 
managerial ownership however, the coefficient was negative though statistically 
insignificant. But then the negative sign conformed to the agency theory as 
well which suggested that paying of dividend should be the alternative as the 
managers’ stake decreases in the firm.
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Table 6. Additional Analysis of Dividend Payers 
PANEL A PANEL B
Expected 
sign
Coefficient Z-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics
INSTDUM + 2.04 2.93*** 0.018 1.98**
MANGOWS - -0.94 -0.80 0.035 1.67*
FSIZE + 1.06 2.66*** 0.000 0.02
RETE + 4.62 4.89*** 0.012 1.45
FLEV - 0.78 1.68* 0.003 0.60
LNSALES -/+ 0.34 1.91* 0.000 0.12
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes





H-L test p-value 0.6259
R2      10.05
F-Stat 2.12***
In the second stage of the additional test, the study used a continuous 
dependent variable known as dividend yield which was consistent with previous 
studies (for instance, Chang et al., 2016; Hu & Kumar, 2004) with only dividend 
payers as the sample firms for the estimation. In this case the F-statistic was 2.12 
which was significant at 1% with the R2 value of 10.05% thus, suggesting the 
fitness of the model. The result from this estimation showed that institutional 
shareholding was highly significant which supported the stated hypothesis of the 
study and prior evidence. While institutional shareholding remained positively 
significant, the coefficient of the managerial shares in the firm reversed from 
negative to positive and was statistically significant thus contradicting the 
earlier findings of the main results. The results may be interpreted as a form 
of managerial entrenchment. According to the entrenched view, a manager 
may use dividends to safeguard his position (Farinha, 2003). Therefore, he or 
she may be more likely to pay greater dividends so that he/she portrays the 
identity of a good manager who protects or aligns his/her interests with those of 
other shareholders. Moreover, it is possible that the dividend payers had more 
committed and entrenched managers. Jo and Pan (2009) posited that managers 
may be committed to their responsibilities voluntarily to save their jobs which 
may in turn limit their opportunistic behaviour.
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Consequently, the results of Table 5 and 6 suggest that the presence of 
institutional investors in the firm may lead to the likelihood of making cash 
dividends in the firm; whereas, managerial shareholding may decrease the 
probability of paying dividends.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we analyse how institutional and managerial shareholdings 
affect the decision to pay cash dividends. A logit regression was used to estimate 
the effect these variables had on the decision to pay dividends. Consequently, 
the results of this study suggested the importance of large scale ownership. The 
study provides that the presence of institutional investors in the firm may lead 
to a likelihood of making cash dividend payments. The likelihood of paying the 
dividends becomes more prevalent in firms with higher dividend yields. The 
results also showed that institutional investors may use dividends as a control 
tool to avoid free-riding problems in addressing agency conflicts.
Whereas, the relationship between managerial shareholdings and the 
probability of paying dividends were inversely related which also lend support to 
the agency theory. The policy implication of this finding is that regulatory bodies 
may consider all institutional and managerial owners irrespective of whether 
their holdings is 5% or below in the enforcement of good governance and 
policies such as taxation. Moreover, further studies could consider combining 
these ownership variables with board independence and gender diversity. 
Such an approach could provide more insights on how large owners may be 
influenced by board structures. This approach could also enhance the level of 
our understanding on ownership structures. In addition, it will be useful if future 
researchers consider various classes of institutional investors separately such as 
banks, discount houses, pension institutions and insurance firms in analysing 
their individual roles on firms’ decision to pay dividends.
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